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An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posnert
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created on
October 1, 1982, by a merger of the appellate section of the U.S. Court
of Claims (the jurisdiction of which was limited to cases in which the
federal government was the defendant) with the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA). The new court inherited the appellate
jurisdiction of the CCPA, which was limited, so far as patents were
concerned, to appeals from decisions by the Patent and Trademark
Office. More important, so far as patent law is concerned, the new
court was given exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from federal dis-
trict courts in patent infringement cases. Before then such appeals had
gone to the regional court of appeals in which the district court whose
decision was being appealed was located. This system had been criti-
cized for producing inconsistent results. The courts of appeals differed
widely in their attitude toward patent validity, reflecting the tug of war
between those who thought patents essential to technological progress
and those who thought them mainly a tool for stifling competition.
The preponderant attitude seems to have been negative, as only about
35 percent of patents whose validity was challenged in court survived
the challenge.' The intercircuit differences fomented forum shopping,
which was possible because there would often be multiple alleged in-
fringers. There was even a risk of inconsistent rulings concerning the
same patent, since a judgment of validity would not bind an alleged in-
fringer who had not been a party to the suit in which the judgment
was rendered.
It was predictable that a specialized patent court would be more
inclined than a court of generalists to take sides on the fundamental
question whether to favor or disfavor patents, especially since interest
t Landes is Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics, The University of Chicago
Law School. Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior
lecturer at the Law School. This Essay, which was prepared for a colloquium on intellectual
property law held at the University of Chicago Law School on June 21, 2003, draws in part on
Chapter 12 ("The Patent Court: A Statistical Evaluation") of our book The Economic Structure
of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard 2003). We thank the participants at the Colloquium for
their helpful suggestions.
I See Gloria K. Koenig, Patent Invalidity: A Statistical and Substantive Analysis 4-18 to 4-
19, 4-22 to 4-23 (Clark Boardman rev ed 1980) (presenting data on district and appeals court
patent decisions, 1953 through 1978); P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J Patent &
Trademark Off Socy 233, 236 (1956) (presenting data on patent infringement and validity in ap-
pellate courts).
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groups that had a stake in patent policy would be bound to play a lar-
ger role in the appointment of the judges of such a court than they
would in the case of the generalist federal courts. It would be difficult
to get the patent bar excited about the appointment of an appellate
judge who might hear only two or three patent appeals a year, but if
the judge were going to be a member of the court that heard all patent
appeals, the patent bar and its clients would exert themselves to influ-
ence the selection. A patent court would be more likely to take the
pro-patent side of this fundamental controversy simply because a
court that is focused on a particular government program, like an ad-
ministrative agency (invariably specialized), is more likely than a gen-
eralist court to identify with the statutory scheme that it is charged
with administering. This has been the bent of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office itself. Prediction is complicated by the fact that the Fed-
eral Circuit is only semi-specialized, since it has a substantial non-
patent jurisdiction. However, although only about 30 percent of the
judges of the court in recent years have had a patent background,'
those judges have written 63 percent of the patent opinions,' suggest-
ing that their influence on the court's patent jurisprudence has been
preponderant.
As expected, the Federal Circuit has turned out to be a pro-
patent court in comparison to the average of the regional courts that it
displaced in the patent domain. The evidence that supports this con-
clusion is set forth in the book chapter on which this Essay is based.'
Among the principal findings in that chapter, the creation of the Fed-
eral Circuit appears to have had a positive and significant impact on
the number of patent applications, the number of patents issued, the
success rate of patent applications, the amount of patent litigation,
and, possibly, the level of research and development expenditures. In
this Essay we extend the statistical analysis in that chapter by includ-
ing additional variables in our original regression analysis, by distin-
guishing among different types of patent applications (for example,
pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical), and by examining separately
U.S.-resident and foreign-resident patent applications filed in Canada
and Japan. The purpose of this additional empirical analysis is to test
additional implications of the "patent court matters" hypothesis.
2 John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity
Cases, 27 Fla St U L Rev 745, 751 (2000) (analyzing the patent backgrounds of judges on the
Federal Circuit).
3 Id at 752-53.
4 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law ch 12 (Harvard 2003).
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I. U.S. PATENT APPLICATIONS
To provide a more refined test of the effect of the creation of the
new court on the number of patent applications, we add two explana-
tory variables to our original regression analysis. These are the prob-
ability that a patent application will be granted and the filing fee (in
2002 dollars). Other things the same, the higher the probability of suc-
cess and the lower the fee, the greater the expected gain from filing
and so the more applications filed. We estimated the probability of
success in year t by the number of patent grants in that year divided
by the number of applications in year t-2. (This assumes that prospec-
tive patent filers have unbiased expectations in year t based on the
success in that year of applications in t-2.) The two-year lag approxi-
mates the average lapse between the application for and the issuance
of a patent. Filing fees are a weighted average of the large-entity and
small-entity filing fees; since 1983, there has been a 50 percent dis-
count for a small entity, which is defined as either a nonemployee or
an employee of a company with no more than five hundred employ-
ees, although nonprofit entities of whatever size are also entitled to
the small-entity discount." The weights are equal to 0.6 and 0.4, respec-
tively, based on the fraction of large- and small-entity filings since
1983. Nominal application fees were $30 in 1952-1965, $65 in 1966-
1983, $300 in 1983-1985, $340 in 1986-1989, $370 in 1989-1990, and
$630 in 1991; since then they have gradually moved up to $770.6 For
years before 1983, these figures are for all applications; for years since
1983 they are for large-entity applications. Thus the small-entity fee is
now $385.
In Table 1 below, the regressions labeled (1) and (2) correspond
to regressions (1) and (2) in Table 2 in the patent court chapter. The
success and fee variables are in logarithms so that the regression coef-
ficient of each of them measures the elasticity of applications with re-
spect to success and filing fees respectively. In both equations the suc-
cess variable has a positive and significant effect on the number of ap-
plications. The elasticity is about 0.18, indicating that a 10 percent in-
crease in the success rate would increase the number of applications
5 35 USC § 41(h)(1) (2000). See also Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees, 47 Fed Reg
43273 (1982) (reducing fees for small businesses effective October 1. 1982).
6 USPTO Fee Schedule, online at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope
fee2004jan01.htm (visited Jan 16, 2004) (listing current fees); Bryson Act, Pub L No 82-593, 66
Stat 792, 796 (1952), codified at 35 USC § 41 (1952) (1952-1965 fees); Patent Fees § 1, Pub L No
89-83, 79 Stat 259 (1965), codified at 35 USC § 41 (1965) (1965-1982 fees); Revision of Patent
and Trademark Fees Confirmation, 47 Fed Reg 41272, 41273 (1982), setting fees at 37 CFR
§ 1.16(a) (1983) (1983-1986 fees); Revision of Patent Fees, 50 Fed Reg 31818, 31824 (1985),
amending 37 CFR § 1.16(a) (1985) (1986-1989 fees); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees, 54
Fed Reg 6893,6900 (1989), amending 37 CFR § 1.16(a) (1989) (1989-1990 fees); Patent Fees, 55
Fed Reg 49040,49041 (1990). amending 37 CFR § 1.16(a) (1991) (1991 fees).
2004]
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by about 1.8 percent. Filing fees have a negative, though at best mar-
ginally significant, effect on applications. The elasticity is very small: a
10 percent increase in filing fees results in only a 0.3 percent reduction
in the number of applications.
Most importantly, adding the success and fee variables to the re-
gression does not change our estimates of the impact of the patent
court. Indeed, when the success variable is added, the coefficients and
levels of significance of the patent-court variables are slightly larger
and more significant than those in the original regressions. The GDP
variable is still positive but is no longer statistically significant. The ad-
justed R2 hardly changes, as is not surprising, since without it we al-
ready explain about 98.6 percent of the variation in the log of applica-
tions.
TABLE 1
Spline Regression Analysis of Patent Applications: 1960-2001
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Patent Applications
Variables OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Year, 0.004 (0.47) 0.003 (0.44)
Year, 0.05 (7.31) 0.05 (6.29)
Year, 0.05 (6.35)
LGDP,_, 0.19 (0.78) 1.20 (0.78)
LRD,_J 0.07 (0.57) 0.06 (0.47)
Lsuccess 0.18 (2.85) 0.18 (2.79)
Lfee -0.03 (1.28) -0.03 (1.27)
Constant 2.25 (0.17) 21.7 (1.69)
Durbin-Watson 1.52 1.53
R 2  0.99 0.99
No. observations 39 39
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares. Equations (1) and (2) assume that
the effective starting date of the Federal Circuit (the Year, variable) is the end
of 1984 or beginning of 1985. Equation (2) divides the period following the ef-
fective date of the Federal Circuit into two subperiods: Year, runs from the
beginning of 1985 to 1991, and Year, from the beginning of 1.992 to 2001.
[71:111
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As in any time-series analysis, we must consider the possibility
that our variable of interest (the creation of the patent court) is pick-
ing up effects that are due to other events that happened at the same
time. Two events in particular deserve attention. One is the passage of
the Hatch-Waxman Act,7 effective at the end of 1984, which is the
starting date that we use for the patent court." The Act expanded the
experimental-use defense to patent infringement and also extended
the term of pharmaceutical drug patents. But since the Act is entirely
limited to drugs, we can avoid its confounding effect by excluding
drugs from our patent-application data. The second possible con-
founding factor was an increase in software patents resulting from a
shift by software manufacturers from protecting their intellectual
property with copyright to protecting it with patents. We can avoid any
confounding effect here by excluding software applications from our
analysis. Drug and computer software patents account for about 3.7
percent and 7.6 percent, respectively, of issued utility patents from
1991 through 1995.
We have reestimated the equations in Table 1 accordingly, but
must acknowledge several problems with the drug and software data.
First, industry-specific application data are limited to applications that
were successful; failed applications, about 30 percent of the total, were
not in our data source! Second, the application data are not usable af-
ter 1995 because many applications filed during or after that year
were still in the prosecution stage in 1999, the last year of the industry-
specific data. Third, the data, because they do not permit us to sepa-
rate software from hardware patents, overstate the number of soft-
ware applications. Whatever the significance of these limitations in the
data, our results do not change when we exclude drug and computer
patents. Although the regression specification is the same as in Table 1,
we reproduce below in Table 2 only the coefficients and t-statistics of
the year variables. We note, however, that in the new regression the
success variable is positive and significant (elasticity of 0.19); the filing
fee variable is negative but only marginally significant; and neither the
GDP nor the R&D variable is significant. A new result is that the rate
of growth of applications is 4.7 percent from 1992 to 1995 compared to
5.7 percent between 1985 and 1991. Although this difference is not
7 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat
1585, codified at 35 USC § 156 (2000) (enabling the extension of patents for drugs, medical de-
vices, or food additives under certain conditions).
8 See note in Table 1 above.
9 The industry-specific data are from Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Tra-
jtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools 8,41-
42 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 8498 Oct 2001), online at http://
papers.nber.org/papers/w8498 (visited Oct 25,2003).
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significant, it points in the right direction-a reduction over time in
the impact of the Federal Circuit, which we predicted in our book
chapter.
TABLE 2
Spline Regression Analysis of Patent Applications Minus Drugs and Computers:
1993-1995
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variables Equation (1) Equation (2)
Year, 0.006 (0.008) 0.006 (0.76)
Year, 0.053 (6.51) 0.057 (5.83)
Year, 0.047 (3.65)
Durbin-Watson 1.32 1.38
R2  0.98 0.97
No. observations 33 33
II. U.S.-RESIDENT VERSUS FOREIGN-RESIDENT APPLICATIONS
The chapter of our book did not attempt to distinguish between
patent applications by (and patents issued to) foreign residents versus
U.S. residents. The distinction is potentially important, however, to dis-
criminating between two hypotheses about the cause of the surge in
patent applications and grants starting in the 1980s and documented
in the chapter. In the chapter we suggested that a significant cause was
the pro-patentee orientation of the Federal Circuit. The competing
hypothesis, advanced by Kortum and Lerner," is that the only signifi-
cant cause was accelerated technological progress in the United
States. If Kortum and Lerner are correct, an innovation upsurge in the
U.S. occurring at the same time as the creation of the patent court
gave rise to the positive relation between the creation of the patent
court and the number of patent applications that we found in our
analysis. Since the hypothesized upsurge occurred only in the U.S., we
should not (if Kortum and Lerner are correct) observe a positive cor-
relation between the creation of the patent court and the number of
foreign-resident applications for U.S. patents or grants of those appli-
cations. A complicating factor, however, is that because a U.S. filing
may be merely a way for the foreign inventor to extend the geo-
I( Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What
Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 48 Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series Pub Pol 247,
251-52 (1998).
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graphic scope of his patent, the creation of a pro-patent U.S. court
would be less of an inducement to foreign than to U.S. inventors.
Figure 1 graphs U.S.-resident and foreign-resident applications
from 1963 to 2000." Notice the sharp increase in U.S.-resident applica-
tions beginning in the early 1980s, whereas foreign applications appear
to grow at a fairly steady rate throughout the entire period. The con-
trast supports the Kortum-Lerner hypothesis, but we must use regres-
sion analysis for a more precise test of the hypothesis.
FIGURE 1
Time Series of U.S. and Foreign Patent Applications
200,(100
150,0M0
.
50,0M)
1960 1970 1981 199 2(10
0 Domestic Applications - Foreign Applications I
Equations (1) and (2) in Table 3 reestimate the regressions pre-
sented earlier in this Essay, but for U.S. residents only. Equations (3)
and (4) are the corresponding regressions for foreign residents. The
foreign regressions include the years and success variables, as do the
U.S. regressions, and an estimate of worldwide real GDP' 2 (excluding
the U.S.), but no measures of "foreign" research and development ex-
penditures. We measure the probability of success without distinguish-
ing between U.S. and foreign residents. Thus we assume that the PTO
does not treat foreign residents differently from U.S. residents. As a
I' The Patent Office provides data on the nationality of the inventor listed first in the pat-
ent application.
12 See Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1
(Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania Oct 2002), online at
http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt (visited Oct 25, 2003). Worldwide GDP is in trillions of
1996 dollars.
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check on this assumption, we estimated the U.S. and foreign regres-
sions with success-specific variables, but this did not affect our results.
TABLE 3
Spline Regression Analysis of U.S.- and Foreign-Resident Patent Applications:
1960-2001
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent US. Residents Foreign Residents
Variables OLS OLS PW PW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year, -0.004 -0.004 0.035 0.035
(0.38) (0.37) (2.47) (2.43)
Year, 0.06 0.06 0.051 0.05
(6.52) (5.40) (4.69) (3.32)
Year, - 0.06 - 0.05
(6.12) (3.88)
LGDP,, -0.03 -0.03 0.22 0.21
(0.09) (0.09) (0.84) (0.82)
LRD,_, -0.05 -0.04 -
(0.33) (0.27)
Lsuccess 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
(2.25) (2.15) (2.26) (2.22)
Lfee -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06
(1.09) (1.05) (2.15) (2.07)
PCT Dummy - - -0.037 -0.04
(0.76) (0.75)
Constant 19.7 19.7 -59.5 -59.6
(1.13) (1.11) (2.15) (2.11)
Rho - - 0.70 0.74
Durbin-Watson 1.84 1.84 1.79 1.79
R2  0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99
No. observations 38 38 38 38
Notes: PW denotes Prais-Winston correction for first-order autocorrelation. Year,
assumes that the effective start of the Federal Circuit is 1985. Equations (2) and (4)
divide the post-1985 period into two subperiods: 1985-1991 (Year,) and 1992-2001
(Year,). GDP for foreign residents is world GDP minus U.S. GDP.
[71:111
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The U.S. regressions reveal a positive and highly significant im-
pact of the patent-court variables (Year, in equation (3) and Year, and
Year, in equation (4)). Indeed, these regressions suggest an even faster
rate of growth in U.S. applications than in all applications-6 percent
per year compared to 5 percent per year, although this difference is
not statistically significant. As before, we find a positive and significant
effect of the probability of success on the number of applications and
a negative but statistically insignificant effect of the filing fee on the
number of applications.
The regression results for foreign applicants (equations (3) and
(4) in Table 3) provide modest support for our hypothesis that the
patent court contributed to the increase in patent applications. The
rate of growth of foreign applications in the post-creation period is
positive and statistically significant, although of smaller magnitude
than we find for the U.S. applicants-5 percent per year compared to
more than 6 percent, though again the difference is not statistically
significant. In contrast to our finding with respect to U.S. residents, we
also find a positive and significant increase in foreign applications be-
fore the creation of the Federal Circuit. But the rate of growth in that
period is smaller (3.2 percent compared to 5 percent), although the
difference is statistically significant only in equation (3). The success
variable is positive (with an elasticity of about 0.14) and significant;
the worldwide-GDP variable is positive and insignificant; and the fil-
ing fee is negative and significant."
The fact that the differences in growth rates between the pre- and
post-patent-court years are larger for U.S. than for foreign residents
suggests, however, that the patent court is not the only reason for the
increase in applications since the mid-1980s; for if it were we would
expect comparable rates of increases for U.S. and foreign residents.
The 1.2 percent higher rate for U.S. applicants (6.2 compared to 5.0
percent) implies that about 20 percent of the increase in applications
by U.S. residents was due to factors unrelated to the patent court. It
can be argued, moreover, that the true impact of the patent court is
measured by the 1.8 percent difference between the growth of for-
eign-resident applications before and after the effective date of the
court-3.2 percent, compared to 5.0 percent in regressions (1) and (2).
This would mean that of the roughly 6.2 percent increase in U.S.-
resident applications that our regression analysis attributes to the
creation of the patent court, less than 30 percent (still a substantial
percentage) was due to that and 70 percent was due to other factors.
13 Both foreign regressions are corrected for first-order autocorrelation.The Prais-Winston
method, which we use for making the correction, is an option in Stata that allows one to retain
the first observation in the regression, which is lost when the Cochran-Orcutt method is used.
2004]
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Just as with our analysis in Part I of this Essay, we have two pos-
sible confounding variables with regard to foreign-resident patents.
First, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)," effective in 1978, to
which the major nations, including the United States, are signatories,
makes it simpler for nonresidents to file patent applications, thus ef-
fectively reducing the cost of filing patents outside one's own country.
One might expect this to lead to an increase in U.S. patent applica-
tions by non-U.S. residents. To test this hypothesis, we added a dummy
variable that takes a value of 0 before 1978 and 1 thereafter to the re-
gressions in Table 3 for foreign-resident applications. As shown in that
table, the regression coefficient on PCT is negative and statistically in-
significant-we cannot reject the hypothesis that the PCT had no im-
pact on U.S. patent filings by foreign residents. More importantly, none
of our prior results is changed by the addition of the PCT variable."
The second possible confounding variable concerns U.S. patent
applications filed by Japanese residents, which might have grown rap-
idly over the last thirty years not because of the creation of the patent
court but instead because of economic growth (though Japan has ex-
perienced very little growth in recent years), increased innovation, and
a greater willingness of Japanese firms to seek intellectual property
protection outside Japan.
14 28 UST 7645.TIAS No 8733 (1978).
15 We had considered adding a dummy variable for TRIPS, the new international treaty
that sets minimum enforcement standards for intellectual property rights. See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Apr 15, 1994), reprinted in The Legal
Texts: Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Annex IC at 321-53
(Cambridge 1994). But we refrained because of the late dates for implementation-one year
from 1995 for developed countries, five years from 1995 for developing countries. and eleven
years from 1995 for less developed countries.
[71:111
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Figure 2 seeks to correct for a "Japanese effect" by separating
U.S. patent applications for all foreign residents, for Japanese resi-
dents, and for foreign residents excluding Japanese. The figure shows
that Japanese filings did increase more rapidly than other foreign fil-
ings over the past fifty years, accounting for 20 percent of foreign ap-
plications in 1970 and 48 percent by 1991, before declining to 40 per-
cent by 2000. We therefore reestimated in Table 4 the foreign-resident
regressions with Japanese applicants excluded (equations (1) and (2)).
If the patent court had a positive impact on patent filings, we would
expect this result to hold when Japanese applications are excluded.
Table 4 also includes a separate regression on U.S. patent applications
by Japanese residents (equation (3)).
FIGURE 2
Time Series of Foreign Patent Applications:
Japanese and Other Foreign Residents
150,0MX)
IOX0X)-
50,000)
196) 1970 1980) 199) 20XX)
-0- Foreign Applications
Japanese Applications in U.S.
- ForAppXJapan I
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TABLE 4
Spline Regression Analysis of Foreign-Resident Applications:
1965-2000 Excluding Japan and Japan Only
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Foreign Residents
Variables Excluding Japan Japan Only
PW PW OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Year, 0.026 0.022 0.019
(1.71) (1.64) (1.21)
Year, 0.058 0.029 0.014
(4.44) (1.87) (1.90)
Year, 0.07
(5.40)
LGDP,, -0.03 0.08 1.48
(0.13) (0.30) (6.95)
LSuccess 0.14 0.15 0.37
(2.05) (2.14) (2.70)
Lfee -0.08 -0.07 0.11
(2.66) (2.30) (2.74)
PCT Dummy -0.01 -0.03 0.05
(0.22) (0.55) (0.60)
Constant -41.1 -34.0 -29.6
(1.40) (1.28) (0.95)
Rho 0.86 0.69
Durbin-Watson 1.79 1.68 1.51
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99
No. observations 36 38 36
Note: PW denotes Prais-Winston corrections for first-order autocorrelation.
LGDP in equations (1) and (2) is the logarithm of world GDP net of the U.S.
and Japan. LGDP in equation (3) is for Japan only. The other variables are
the same as those in Table 3.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 indicates little change when
Japanese applications are excluded from foreign applications. We con-
tinue to observe a significant increase in the rate of growth associated
with the creation of the patent court. The success rate has a positive
and significant impact on applications, and fees have a negative and
[71:111
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significant impact; compare equation (3) in Table 3 with equation (1)
in Table 4. When the post-patent-court variable is divided into two pe-
riods (Year 2 and Year, in equation (2) in Table 4), we find a significant
positive difference between the two periods (post-1992 and pre-1992)
(equation (4) in Table 3). Our theory does not directly account for the
lagged response of foreign applications (excluding Japanese applica-
tions), but one possible explanation is that foreign firms required
more time than U.S. firms to conclude that the decisions of the patent
court signaled a significant legal shift in favor of patent holders.
Turning to the "Japan Only" regression in Table 4 (equation (3)),
we see that GDP in Japan and the patent success rate are the most sig-
nificant determinants of Japanese patent applications in the United
States. The creation of the patent court, however, had no significant
impact on the number of applications.
We also added the logarithm of patent applications filed in Japan
(lagged one period) as an independent variable in equation (3). The
regression coefficient was 0.418 and statistically significant (t = 2.02),
indicating that each 10 percent increase in the number of patents filed
in Japan was associated with about a 4 percent increase in Japanese
applications filed in the United States. As we pointed out earlier, pat-
ent applications in Japan have grown rapidly since the 1960s; if 40 per-
cent of these result in a U.S. filing, this means that it is activity in Japan
that largely determines Japanese filings in the U.S., rather than the
existence of the patent court.
The other variables were unchanged by the addition of the Japan
filings, except for the fee variable, which was still positive but no
longer significant (with a coefficient of 0.06 and a t-ratio of 1.56).
III. PATENT APPLICATIONS IN CANADA AND JAPAN
Another way to test the "patent court matters" hypothesis versus
the Kortum-Lerner "surge in U.S. innovation" hypothesis (though we
have pointed out that they are not mutually exclusive) is to examine
patent applications filed outside the United States. If the Federal Cir-
cuit were responsible for most or a substantial part of the increase in
U.S. patent applications, we would not expect to observe similar in-
creases in patent applications in foreign countries starting in the mid-
1980s, although it is conceivable that the increase in foreign applica-
tions in the United States brought about by the patent court might
lead these companies to seek additional patents in their home country.
Figure 3 plots patent applications (in logarithms) for Canada and
Japan between 1960 and 2001 and compares them with U.S. patent ap-
plications. Figure 3 reveals that over this period U.S. and Canadian
applications closely tracked each other, whereas Japanese applications
increased continuously.
20041
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FIGURE 3
Patent Applications (Logarithms) in Canada, Japan, and the United States
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Regression analysis confirms these patterns. We first regressed
the logarithm of patent applications in Japan and Canada on U.S. ap-
plications and a time-trend variable from 1960 to 2000. As both
Figure 3 and the regression (Table 5) show, Canadian and U.S. patent
applications are highly correlated even when time is held constant
(which eliminates any correlation between Canadian and U.S. applica-
tions that is due to the fact that patent applications have increased in
both countries). In contrast, the correlation between U.S. and Japanese
patent applications is negative (again holding constant the increase in
applications in both countries). The results for Canada do not support
the hypothesis that the creation of the patent court has been a signifi-
cant factor in the growth in U.S. applications. Canadian applications
were growing in step with US. applications and it seems unlikely that
the increase in Canada is attributable to the creation of the patent
court in the United States, unless U.S. firms have a practice of rou-
tinely applying for Canadian patents at the same time that they apply
for U.S. ones. Contrary to the last suggestion, it does not appear that
the increase in Canadian applications was the result primarily of an
increase in applications filed by U.S. residents. Although we have data
for only about twenty-four years starting in 1975,"6 Figure 4 indicates
16 WIPO Industrial Property Statistics; Publication B (World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation 1975-2000), online at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/publications/b/index.htm (visited Oct
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that Canadian applications filed by non-U.S. residents grew at a rate
comparable to all Canadian applications.
FIGURE 4
Canadian Patent Applications by U.S. and Non-U.S. Applicants
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The results for Japan are difficult to interpret but are more con-
sistent with the "patent court matters" hypothesis, because, as shown
in Table 5, Japanese patents are negatively correlated with U.S. appli-
cations once we hold constant the time trend of patent applications.
27, 2003). Statistics for 1994-2000 are currently available online and on CD-ROM; statistics for
1975-1994 were published in paper form; statistics for 1983 and 1985 are unavailable.
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TABLE 5
Regression Analysis of Patent Applications in Canada and Japan: 1960-2001
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Patent Applications
Variables Canada Japan
OLS PW
(1) (2)
LUSApp 1.46 -0.51
(17.29) (2.56)
Year -0.02 0.07
(8.05) (11.53)
Constant 32.8 124.8
(8.18) (12.07)
Rho 0.62
Durbin-Watson 1.33 2.06
R 0.95 0.98
No. observations 41 41
Note: PW denotes Prais-Winston corrections for first-order
autocorrelation.
We also estimated regression equations for Japan and Canada us-
ing the time variables Year, and Year, and then Year,, Year,, and Year,;
GDP for the respective countries; and the patent-application success
rate. Japanese patents, we find, grew significantly more slowly in the
post-patent-court era than in the pre-patent-court era, which is consis-
tent with the "patent court matters" hypothesis. On the other hand,
the results for Canada are more consistent with the "innovation
surge" hypothesis because Canadian patent applications increased
significantly in the post-patent-court era even though no such court
was created in Canada.
IV. PATENT GRANTS
We turn now from patents applied for to (U.S.) patents granted.
In Table 12-2 of the book chapter, we showed that the number of pat-
ents issued had declined by about 2 percent per year in the period
prior to the effective date of the patent court but had declined insig-
nificantly in the subsequent period, and we concluded that the patent
court appeared to have arrested a long-term decline in patent grants.
We now examine whether that result continues to hold when we look
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at U.S. and foreign patent grantees separately, as we do in Table 5,
where equations (1) and (2) regress grants to U.S. residents and (3)
and (4) regress grants to foreign residents. The equations are of the
same form, use the same lags, etc., as the patents-granted equations in
Table 12-2.
The regression estimates for patents granted to U.S. residents are
similar to what we found with aggregated data for U.S. and foreign
residents. There is a small, though statistically significant, decline of
about 0.1 percent per year in grants prior to the effective date of the
patent court and a small, but again statistically significant, positive in-
crease of about 0.5 percent per year after that date, holding constant
the number of patent applications. Moreover, the differences between
the pre- and post-patent-court variables are statistically significant in
both equations (1) and (2). Consistent with our results in the chapter,
the patent court appears to have arrested a slow decline in patent
grants. Putting the application and grant regressions together, there-
fore, we find that the main effect of the patent court has been to in-
crease the number of patent applications rather than the number of
patent grants, holding applications constant. Surprisingly, applications
(lagged two years) have a negative (not positive) effect on patent
grants, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect is
zero.
The analysis of patent grants to foreign residents indicates a small
(less than 0.1 percent), though not statistically significant, increase in
grants after the effective date of the patent court. Foreign applications
have a positive but not statistically significant impact on foreign
grants.
Overall, the U.S.-resident and foreign-resident statistics indicate a
small positive increase in the rate of growth of grants after the crea-
tion of the patent court, holding constant patent applications. The ef-
fect is small, however, relative to the court's effect on applications.
2004]
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TABLE 6
Spline Regression Analysis of U.S.- and Foreign-Resident Patent Grants: 1960-2001
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent US. Residents Foreign Residents
Variables OLS OLS PW PW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year, -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003
(4.67) (4.82) (3.92) (3.87)
Year, 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
(6.61) (4.25) (4.26) (2.43)
Year, - 0.006 0.004
(6.77) (3.63)
LRDj 0.02 0.03
(2.18) (2.47)
LUSApp -0.02 -0.02 - -
(1.32) (1.36)
LFORApp - - 0.02 0.02
(1-19) (1.21)
Constant 4.48 4.61 -3.88 -53.0
(9.46) (9.59) (2.80) (2.00)
Rho - - 0.64 0.63
Durbin-Watson 1.84 1.91 1.74 1.74
R2  0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
No. observations 36 36 36 36
Notes: PW denotes Prais-Winston corrections for first-order autocorrelation. All
equations assume that the effective starting date of the Federal Circuit (the Year,
variable) is the end of 1984 or beginning of 1985. Equations (2) and (4) divide the
period following the effective date of the Federal Circuit into two subperiods: Year,
runs from the beginning of 1985 to 1991 and Year, from the beginning of 1992 to
2001. GDP variable for foreign residents is world GDP minus U.S. GDP.
To summarize, the more refined statistical analysis in this Essay
yields results consistent with our earlier study. The creation in 1982 of
a court having a monopoly of patent appeals has had a significant ef-
fect on patent activity as a consequence of the pro-patent leanings of
the new court.
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